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Executive Overview
Critics of globalization claim that firms are being driven to shift employment abroad by the prospects of
cheaper labor. Yet the evidence for this, beyond anecdotes, is slim. In this article, we review evidence on
whether firms that do business in foreign countries are substituting foreign for domestic labor. We review
the results of previous studies and present new firm-level evidence showing that, in fact, increases in
employment in low-income countries do hurt employment at home. The premise that foreign expansion of
U.S. multinationals encourages employment at home is a myth, but the domestic employment costs of
offshoring are probably fairly small in magnitude.
Critics of globalization claim that U.S. firms areshutting down factories at home and shiftingemployment abroad to countries with cheaper
labor and lower labor standards. Yet the evidence
for this, beyond anecdotes, is slim. Are U.S. em-
ployers really expanding in low cost locations and
contracting employment at home? In a now-infa-
mous press conference for the Economic Report of
the President (2004), Gregory Mankiw pointed
out that U.S. outsourcing is good for the U.S.
economy. More recently, Mankiw and his co-
author, Phillip Swagel, have further argued that
“increased employment in the overseas affiliates of
U.S. multinationals is associated with more em-
ployment in the U.S. parent rather than less.”
Whether doing business abroad creates domes-
tic jobs continues to be a contentious topic in the
U.S. Congress. The most recent controversy cen-
ters on a 2004 Department of Commerce (DOC)
report on workforce globalization in high-tech
industries, which the Administration refused to
release for over two years. After repeated Congres-
sional inquiries, the government issued a 12-page
“summary” in 2005 which clearly glosses over the
job costs of outsourcing and the cost-cutting mo-
tivation emphasized in the original report. The
fact that some administration officials may have
felt it necessary initially to cover up findings from
the 2004 report suggests that the impact of expan-
sion abroad on U.S. jobs remains an important
political issue.
It seems intuitively obvious that the increased
internationalization of U.S. business could be ac-
companied by downsizing at home. This is only
natural as the U.S. loses its comparative advan-
tage in producing some types of goods (for exam-
ple, apparel) and shifts to the production of other
goods (aircraft, high-tech). According to standard
trade theory, losses to some groups from shifting
comparative advantage are outweighed by the
overall gains which accrue to the economy in the
form of lower priced goods for consumers, higher
profits for enterprises, and better jobs for workers
in industries where the U.S. has a comparative
advantage.
Why should offshore activities—either
through outsourcing or outward foreign invest-
ment (the expansion of U.S. affiliates abroad)—
be perceived any differently than international
trade in goods? Just as international trade benefits
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the economy as a whole, but creates both winners
and losers in the domestic economy, we would
expect some winners and losers from offshoring as
well. The winners are likely to be the owners of
firms who are able to increase profits by finding
lower labor or investment costs abroad, as well as
the workers whose jobs are made easier by having
access to a global labor force. A concrete example
of this is Oracle, which employs thousands of
workers in southern India to do tasks that could
not be done easily or cheaply in California. The
losers are those who must now compete with
workers in foreign locations, whether these are
steel workers in Brazil or computer programmers
in Bangalore. Estimating whether a group of U.S.
workers are helped or hurt by offshoring is even
more difficult if the firm could not have survived
without spinning off some of its activities abroad.
What is clear, however, is that there will be losers
within the U.S. labor force, just as there are both
winners and losers from international trade.
Yet several prominent economists have argued
that firms doing business overseas are expanding
the manufacturing labor force both in the United
States and abroad. Such an argument is difficult to
reconcile with the fact that U.S. multinational
firms shed more than 3 million manufacturing
jobs (net) in the U.S. between 1977 and 1999,
while expanding employment in low-income
countries1. Indeed, firms like Mattel and Levi
Strauss that once employed a significant number
of workers in the U.S. no longer manufacture in
the United States. Where does this evidence for
the job-creating effects of offshore outsourcing
come from?
We begin the first half of this essay by review-
ing the existing evidence on the domestic employ-
ment effects of relocating economic activity
abroad, drawing primarily on studies done on the
United States. To date, almost all the academic
research in this field has focused on manufactur-
ing, not services. This is primarily because the
available data on services activity overseas repre-
sent such a tiny fraction of services activity in the
U.S. that it is difficult to know what to make of
these data. For this reason, most of our discussion
focuses on trends in manufacturing.
In the second half of this paper, we present our
own evidence on the impact of offshoring on U.S.
jobs and U.S. investment, drawing on firm-level
data collected by the Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis (BEA) in Washington, D.C. As pointed out
by Mankiw and Swagel, “The BEA data are today
essentially the only solid numbers on the activities
of U.S. multinationals.” The firms surveyed ac-
count for approximately 60 percent of U.S. sales
and employment in manufacturing, 70 percent of
exports, and 80 percent of private R&D in man-
ufacturing, a sizeable share of the U.S. economy.2
The dataset also includes information on other
international activities of U.S. enterprises, such as
trade, investment, and research and development
activities of the parents and affiliates. Our own
results indicate that many factors have contrib-
uted to the net decline in U.S. manufacturing
employment of multinational firms, including
physical investment in affiliates, trade, and tech-
nological change.
Our research points out an important omission
in almost all of the previous work in this area. The
relationship between employment in the U.S. and
abroad within multinational firms depends on
whether the U.S. subsidiary (called an “affiliate”)
is located in a high- or low-income country. Ag-
gregating across all locations, employment expan-
sions and contractions in U.S. multinational par-
ents and their affiliates move, on average, in the
same direction. However, these averages mask sig-
nificant heterogeneity across different kinds of
enterprises. In developed countries, the positive
relationship between employment at home and
abroad is driven by contraction in both locations:
the overall contraction in U.S. manufacturing
employment has been accompanied by an overall
contraction in affiliate employment. For parents
that hire workers in developed countries–roughly
half the sample–the story is different. For these
firms, the contraction in U.S. manufacturing em-
ployment has been accompanied by an increase in
affiliate employment.
This evidence highlights the importance of dif-
1 Our numbers differ from official BEA statistics because we do not use
data estimated by the BEA. 2 This is for the period 1982-1999.
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ferentiating between jobs in low-income countries
and jobs in developed (or industrialized) coun-
tries. It also helps to reconcile academic argu-
ments for complementarity with anecdotal evi-
dence in the popular press of factory closings and
falling manufacturing employment. To summa-
rize, our research suggests that the decline in U.S.
manufacturing employment is driven by a number
of factors, including (but not limited to) reloca-
tion of activities to low-income countries. Before
reporting these new results, however, we begin by
defining some terms and reviewing the previous
literature.
DistinguishingbetweenOffshoringand
Outsourcing
Outsourcing means a firm purchases inputs orservices from another firm. A U.S. firm couldoutsource either goods (i.e., car parts) or ser-
vices (i.e., call centers). Outsourcing can be done
at home or abroad. For example, in the electronics
industry, several of the large contract manufactur-
ers, like Solectron, are U.S.-based multinationals.
When IBM outsources to Solectron, it is outsourc-
ing its business to another U.S. firm. By contrast,
if IBM outsources to a Chinese contract manufac-
turer, we call this offshore outsourcing or offshor-
ing. This latter type of outsourcing is very difficult
to measure because it would require detailed firm
level data on both U.S. companies and foreign
companies.
Offshoring refers to a broad range of tasks ex-
ecuted by a firm in another country that could
include setting up a foreign subsidiary or outsourc-
ing offshore through an arm’s length agreement
with another firm.3 While offshore outsourcing
was primarily restricted to manufacturing activity
in earlier decades, in recent years firms have be-
gun to outsource services, such as back office
processing or call center activity, to foreign par-
ties. In the United States, firms that set up foreign
subsidiaries are called U.S. based multinationals.
If a U.S. firm owns at least 10 percent of a com-
pany abroad, this is referred to as direct foreign
investment. The company that has made the di-
rect investment is called the “parent” and the
foreign business enterprise is called the “affiliate.”
U.S. companies frequently purchase final goods
from abroad either from third parties or from their
own affiliates through intra-firm trade or both.
They also sell and invest in foreign markets. From
an economist’s viewpoint, these different aspects
of doing business abroad are all equally important
and likely to affect U.S. labor.4
Assessing thePrevious Literature
Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2003) showthat employment of low-skilled workers inforeign affiliates of U.S. corporations reduces
employment in the U.S. The size of the effect is
significant, suggesting that a 10 percent fall in
affiliate wages would reduce U.S. labor demand by
3 percent. To use these results to identify the
actual impact of foreign employment on U.S.
wages, we need a number for the actual change in
foreign affiliate wages. Our own research shows
that low-income affiliate wages fell by 50 percent
between 1982 and 1999. If we combine this in-
formation on wage trends with the estimates in
Hanson et al., this implies a fall in demand for
labor by U.S. multinationals of 15 percentage
points. As pointed out by Hanson, Mataloni, and
Slaughter, “This finding is consistent with the
idea that expansion abroad exposes workers in
U.S. parents to competition from foreign labor.” 5
Yet Hanson et al. also find that higher sales
abroad of U.S. parents is associated with expanded
employment at home. In other words, when U.S.
3 There is not complete consensus on these definitions, however.
Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan (2004) define outsourcing as the
offshore trade in arm’s-length services, while others such as Trefler (2005)
adopt a broader perspective and refer to outsourcing in either goods or
services.
4 All of the work that we review studies the form of offshoring that
involves setting up a foreign affiliate. This is partially a limitation of the
data. However, in our own work, we show that previous work has over-
looked important aspects of offshoring, such as investment abroad, that are
likely to impact domestic employment. We also investigate the impact of
imports from third parties on parent employment. Since it is unclear
whether these imports are intermediate inputs or final goods, we cannot say
for sure whether these imports represent offshore outsourcing.
5 See page 19 in their paper. Oddly, and this is perhaps the reason why
Mankiw and Swagel were confused, Hanson et al. in their abstract conclude
that “we do not find strong evidence that foreign and parent labor are
substitutes.” Perhaps, since one of the authors now sits on the Council of
Economic Advisors, this disconnect between their actual findings and their
abstract reflects wishful thinking on their part.
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foreign affiliates increase sales in other countries,
U.S. labor benefits from this activity. Mankiw and
Swagel (2006) emphasize this result, pointing out
that “success overseas leads to job gains in the
United States.”
We believe that such a conclusion is too opti-
mistic. Why? When a U.S. firm increases sales
abroad through foreign direct investment in an-
other country, this is typically accompanied by
investments in building capacity abroad, which
means less investment at home and consequently
less job creation. In our own work, we confirm
that foreign sales increase U.S. jobs, but we also
show that physical investment in affiliates and
employment in affiliates, as well as imports from
affiliates, generate employment losses at home.
The net impact of these offsetting forces has been
to reduce manufacturing employment.
These results point to one way in which the
effects of offshoring differ from the impact of in-
ternational trade on the domestic economy. In the
case of international trade, domestic enterprises
respond to international competition by shifting
to the production of goods in which the U.S.
economy has a comparative advantage. This
means that investment by firms remains at home
as companies invest less in apparel factories and
more in high technology development. With off-
shoring however, our research confirms that ex-
pansion in affiliates is accompanied by a shifting
of new investment to foreign locations. This
means that international expansion will have
long-term effects as firms choose to invest and
develop new products outside the United States.
The only research which unambiguously finds a
positive relationship between hiring at home and
abroad by U.S. multinationals is the recent work-
ing paper by Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005). Desai
et al., using the same BEA dataset as Hanson et
al., find that an additional $10 dollars of foreign
capital investment is associated with $15 addi-
tional domestic investment, and increasing for-
eign employment is associated with increasing
employment at home. Mankiw and Swagel con-
clude from this that “foreign activity does not
crowd out domestic activity; the reverse is true”
(p. 30).
We would like to emphasize the broad similar-
ity between our findings and those of Hanson et
al., both of which are at odds with the claims of
Mankiw and Swagel (2006). Hanson et al. find
that low-skilled employment abroad substitutes
for U.S. employment, while high-skilled employ-
ment abroad is complementary to U.S. employ-
ment. As we show in our own research, measuring
the impact of foreign affiliate employment in
high- and low-income countries on U.S. parent
employment leads to very different results. Con-
sistent with Hanson et al., we find that employ-
ment in low-income affiliates does indeed crowd
out U.S. employment. Employment in high-
income affiliates of U.S. companies abroad is pos-
itively correlated with employment in low-income
affiliates because employment has contracted in
both high-income affiliates and the United States.
To summarize, employment in low-income affili-
ates crowds out U.S. employment, while employ-
ment in high-income affiliates moves in the same
direction as employment in the U.S.
In addition, our results show that when U.S.
multinationals increase capital investment
abroad, this reduces employment at home. This is
true whether or not that capital is invested in
high- or low-income affiliates. Why do these re-
sults differ from Desai et al., who are using the
same data? This is because they only perform
pair-wise correlations: U.S. versus foreign employ-
ment, physical investment abroad versus at home.
They do not examine the impact of capital invest-
ment abroad on employment at home, in a mul-
tivariate regression.
Other related work includes Brainard and
Riker (1997, 2001), Muendler and Becker
(2006), and Bernard, Jensen, and Schott
(2005). Both Brainard and Riker (1997) and
Brainard and Riker (2001) use the same BEA
manufacturing data, for 1983 to 1992, which
makes it somewhat less current than other stud-
ies. Their 1997 working paper focuses only on
employment in the foreign operations of U.S.
companies and shows that labor demand across
high- and low-income locations is, in fact, com-
plementary. This means that employment in
high- and low-income offshore locations is pos-
itively related: when a U.S. company’s opera-
tions expand in Germany, they simultaneously
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expand in countries such as Mexico and China.
However, affiliate employment decisions across
different locations within the same region are
substitutes. This suggests that the employment
of a U.S. corporation in China would be a
substitute for employment in Indonesia as the
latter are in the same region (or Mexico and
Honduras), but employment of a U.S. firm in
China would be complementary with affiliate
employment in Canada as these two are in
different regions.
Brainard and Riker (2001) use a translog cost
function approach to derive the implied substi-
tutability between labor employed by the U.S.
parent and its affiliates. Unlike their earlier
paper, this study includes employment decisions
within the U.S. as well. They find that foreign
affiliate employment abroad is a substitute for
employment in the U.S., but the magnitudes are
small. Foreign employees in both high- and low-
income affiliate locations substitute for U.S.
employment: for low-income affiliates, a 10 per-
centage point decline in wages would be asso-
ciated with a .15 percent fall in U.S. employ-
ment, while a 10 percentage point decline in
high-income affiliate wages would be associated
with a 1.1 percent fall in U.S. employment. The
fact that Brainard and Riker (2001) reach dif-
ferent conclusions than Brainard and Riker
(1997) can be in part attributed to a different
methodology and also to the use of different
samples from the BEA data. While Brainard and
Riker (1997) restrict their work to non-U.S.
locations, Brainard and Riker (2001) focus on
U.S. employment outcomes. It is this latter re-
search focusing on the U.S. that finds evidence
that “labor abroad substitutes for parent labor”
(Brainard and Riker (2001), p. 13).
Recent work by Muendler and Becker suggests
that the European experience is similar. Two pa-
pers, by Muendler et al. (2005) and Muendler and
Becker (2006) have examined the impact of off-
shore outsourcing on domestic employment in
Sweden and Germany. Both studies find that for-
eign affiliate employment is a substitute for em-
ployment in a company’s home country, but again
the magnitudes are small. The results for Germany
and Sweden are remarkably similar to those re-
ported by Brainard and Riker (2001), suggesting a
pattern of substitution between employment at
home and abroad.
To summarize, the degree to which foreign
employment affects domestic labor outcomes
will depend critically on where the offshoring
activity is located. The expansion of operations
and jobs in high-income countries is likely to
have very different effects on a company’s em-
ployment in the U.S. than is an expansion of
operations and jobs in low-income countries on
U.S. labor market outcomes. We will see later
in this essay that the reason is because expan-
sion into low-income countries is motivated by
cost-cutting, while expansion into high-income
countries is driven by the need to break into
foreign markets. This hypothesis regarding U.S.
multinational activity is consistent with evi-
dence on the employment effects of import
competition presented by Bernard, Jensen, and
Schott (2005). Bernard et al. examine the im-
pact of U.S. imports on both the survival and
employment of U.S. manufacturing firms. They
find that imports only harm U.S. manufacturing
employment when those imports are from low
wage countries.
AnEconomic Cover-up?
Beyond the research findings, we need to putthis issue in a political context. Indeed, thequestion of whether multinational expansion
abroad creates jobs at home continues to be a
contentious topic in the U.S. Congress. The most
recent controversy centers on a 2004 Department
of Commerce (DOC) report on workforce global-
ization in high-tech industries, which was not
released despite ongoing pressure from Congress.
After repeated Congressional inquiries, the gov-
ernment issued a 12-page “summary” report in
September 2005 that the Commerce Department
staff claimed did not accurately reflect the original
report. Indeed the summary report claims that for
every job created abroad, multinationals create
nearly two jobs at home (p. 2). This claim is not
in the original DOC 2004 report, but is based on
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research by Matthew Slaughter (2003), now on
the Council of Economic Advisors.6
The original 2004 DOC report, which is now
publicly available, suggests that both employment
gains and losses are possible from offshore out-
sourcing.7 For example, in semiconductors, one of
the three high-tech industries scrutinized in the
study, the authors report that “the number of
engineers employed offshore by U.S. semiconduc-
tor companies rose by more than 10,000 between
2000 and 2003, while engineers employed in the
United States dropped by 4,000 during the same
period.” In contrast, the so-called summary report
claims that the U.S. semiconductor industry “re-
mains the leader in world market share,” and
points out that highly skilled workers will remain
mostly in the United States (p.7). And while the
full report emphasizes that a major reason for
relocation is labor cost reduction, the summary
report glosses over this economic relationship,
merely noting that the U.S. remains a market
leader in high tech and that international activity
is likely to promote employment at home.
Although the 2004 report would not be partic-
ularly controversial from a researcher’s point of
view, it does point out that there may be both
employment gains as well as losses from offshore
outsourcing, a marked difference from the conclu-
sion drawn in the 2005 summary report. The fact
that some administration officials may have felt it
necessary to present a more rosy picture and with-
hold release of the original study suggests how
protective the administration has become over
such a sensitive issue.
How were the authors of the summary report
able to put such a rosy spin on the facts? The
summary report cites work by CEA member Mat-
thew Slaughter (2003) to argue that U.S. multi-
nationals create jobs at home when they expand
abroad. He points out that there are many reasons
why a U.S. multinational might set up affiliates
abroad apart from seeking low cost labor, such as
the desire to access foreign markets. Yet his con-
tention that “U.S. multinationals have been a
major force behind job creation, not job destruc-
tion” is in direct opposition to work he conducted
with Hanson and Mataloni (2003) showing that
employment of low-skilled workers in foreign af-
filiates reduces employment in the U.S.
The reason the two studies come to different
conclusions is because Slaughter (2003) reports
total employment of U.S. multinationals across all
sectors of the economy, while Hanson, Mataloni,
and Slaughter (2003) are restricted to manufac-
turing. Within the manufacturing sector, enter-
prises cut their U.S. labor force and increased
employment in developing countries. As manu-
facturing growth in the U.S. slowed, these com-
panies expanded into services and wholesale
trade, increasing the number of jobs there. Since
there was almost no affiliate activity in the 1990s
in services or wholesale trade abroad, in the ag-
gregate it is possible to show that net U.S. em-
ployment of these parents increased, as affiliate
employment increased. This is because the fall in
U.S. manufacturing employment was offset by ex-
pansion into other sectors. These trends are evi-
dent in the data reported in Tables 1 and 2.
The fact that affiliate expansion has been ac-
companied by U.S. job contraction within man-
ufacturing is an important message that should
not be lost in the political rancor surrounding the
topic. As U.S. parents have shifted towards ser-
vices and wholesale trade, they initially expanded
very little outside the United States. More re-
cently, however, affiliate expansion in these areas
has increased. If the services industry follows the
trends we have identified in manufacturing, then
outsourcing in services can also be expected to
lead to substitution of domestic workers by lower-
cost foreign workers. It remains to be seen how
important that expansion is for U.S. employment
trends when the BEA 2004 data are released. The
evidence presented in the 2004 report, which the
administration was so reluctant to make public,
suggests that U.S. firms in high tech sectors are
indeed relocating abroad, and that their primary
motivation is to cut labor costs and minimize the
high start-up expenses associated with expansion
at home.
6 See footnote 4, page 2, in the “Six Month Assessment of Workforce
Globalization in Certain-Knowledge-Based Industries,” Technology Ad-
ministration, Department of Commerce, September 2005.
7 The original report is available at http://sciencedems.house.gov/in-
vestigations/investigations_detail.
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HowMuchDoWeKnowAbout Services
Outsourcing?
While there is general agreement that offshoreoutsourcing of business services, such asback office processing, represents a new and
growing type of offshore activity, very little is
actually known about the extent of this “new type
of trade.” While countries keep careful accounts of
the amount of international trade in goods that
enters and leaves the country, accounting for the
amount of services contracted out by companies in
different foreign locations is not easy. While the
BEA keeps statistics on the activities of U.S. com-
panies with foreign affiliates, this is different than
measuring arm’s-length agreements between a
U.S. company and a separate entity that would
provide back-office processing. The latest publicly
available data provided by the BEA is for 1999;
yet much of the increase in offshore outsourcing in
services has probably increased within the last five
years, as advances in communication have made it
easier to contract for services from abroad.
The general consensus on offshore outsourcing
of services is that it probably affects a small frac-
Table1
TrendsofU.S.Multinationals inManufacturing1977-1999
Variable 1977 1982 1989 1994 1999
% Change
77-99
% Change
82-99
Number of Parents 1746 1154 1211 1199 878 98.86% 31.44%
Number of Countries in which Parents Have Affiliates 21.19 20.61 20.35 21.54 19.78 7.14% 4.17%
Developed Countries 12.25 12.54 13.47 13.41 11.33 8.13% 10.70%
Developing Countries 8.80 7.98 6.81 8.09 8.45 4.11% 5.63%
Affiliate Share of Jobs 28.33% 26.57% 31.43% 33.91% 35.62% 20.46% 25.40%
Developed Country Affiliate Share of Jobs 20.09% 18.43% 21.59% 22.78% 20.98% 4.24% 12.14%
Developing Country Affiliate Share of Jobs 8.22% 8.11% 9.84% 11.08% 14.64% 43.88% 44.62%
Affiliate Share of Compensation 18.97% 17.56% 22.96% 25.61% 24.17% 21.52% 27.36%
Developed Country Affiliate Share of Compensation 16.35% 14.44% 20.15% 21.95% 19.27% 15.16% 25.09%
Developing Country Affiliate Share of Compensation 2.59% 3.09% 2.80% 3.63% 4.89% 47.05% 36.80%
Affiliate Share of Total Investment 25.99% 23.29% 25.14% 29.08% 29.10% 10.66% 19.96%
Developed Country Affiliate Share of Investment 20.12% 17.29% 20.95% 23.72% 20.88% 3.63% 17.21%
Developing Country Affiliate Share of Investment 5.67% 5.80% 4.17% 5.33% 8.22% 30.97% 29.36%
Parents
Total Employment 11017 9771 9137 6893 7181 53.42% 36.07%
Real Total Compensation (per worker) 31.34 31.82 33.25 36.67 37.87 17.24% 15.97%
Labor’s Share 0.96 0.91 0.84 0.86 0.79 21.54% 15.03%
Developed Country Affiliates: All
Total Employment 3089 2753 2876 2376 2531 22.05% 8.78%
Real Total Compensation (per worker) 21 21 27 31 27 20.32% 20.05%
Labor’s Share 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.30 101.76% 95.15%
Developing Country Affiliates: All
Total Employment 1263 1079 1311 1156 1766 28.48% 38.91%
Real Total Compensation (per worker) 11 10 9 9 8 38.25% 19.93%
Labor’s Share 1.09 1.18 0.61 0.60 0.67 62.86% 76.96%
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Note: Data is for manufacturing parents and their manufacturing affiliates with non-missing
observations for labor’s share of income, positive employment, and non-zero production employment. Multiple affiliates in one country
are treated as one affiliate.Weighted by employment shares, where applicable. Real wages, real benefits, and real total compensation are
in ’000 of 82-84 U.S. dollars; real net income and real total assets are in ’000,000 of 82-84 U.S. dollars. Employment figures are in ’000.
Return on capital is net income over total assets. Variability in countries of affiliates is defined as the total number of countries in which
the parent added or dropped an affiliate between the previous benchmark survey and the present one.
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tion of the U.S. labor force, but that it is growing
quickly. Two reports by Forrester Research esti-
mate that the number of U.S. services jobs out-
sourced will reach 3.4 million by 2015. Yet as
pointed out by Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srini-
vasan (2004) these numbers do not explain
whether the U.S. economy will have 3.4 million
fewer jobs in 2015, or whether these many workers
will have shifted to different jobs as a result of
outsourcing. Most economists believe that the ag-
gregate number of jobs in an economy is deter-
mined by macroeconomic factors, not by the pres-
sures of international competition. In addition,
millions of jobs are created and destroyed within
the U.S. economy each year. In 2003, for exam-
ple, 30 million new jobs were created and a similar
number were destroyed. Estimates on the number
of jobs lost to offshore outsourcing suggest the
number is very small. For example, the U.S. Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics reported 183,000 mass
layoffs in the first quarter of 2004, out of which
only 4 percent were due to jobs moving overseas
and only 1 percent due to service jobs moving
overseas (Trefler 2005).
Nevertheless, a number of observers remain
concerned because the rate of growth of offshore
outsourcing for services is very high, which makes
it difficult to predict anything with certainty
Table2
TrendsofU.S.Multinationals in Services1977-1999
Variable 1977 1982 1989 1994 1999
% Change
77-99
% Change
82-99
Number of Parents 58 76 112 133 242 317.24% 218.42%
Number of Countries in which Parents Have Affiliates 6.74 4.12 4.92 6.97 11.62 72.31% 182.10%
Developed Countries 5.19 3.10 4.27 5.64 7.61 46.66% 145.72%
Developing Countries 1.56 1.02 0.65 1.33 3.94 153.04% 284.93%
Affiliate Share of Jobs 15.43% 9.21% 16.93% 19.13% 25.09% 62.59% 172.39%
Developed Country Affiliate Share of Jobs 11.67% 7.09% 15.36% 16.22% 19.41% 66.30% 173.65%
Developing Country Affiliate Share of Jobs 3.76% 2.12% 1.57% 2.91% 5.67% 50.86% 167.86%
Affiliate Share of Compensation 13.41% 7.25% 14.99% 17.30% 21.75% 62.20% 200.04%
Developed Country Affiliate Share of Compensation 11.20% 6.06% 14.45% 16.38% 19.29% 72.23% 218.23%
Developing Country Affiliate Share of Compensation 2.21% 1.19% 0.54% 0.92% 2.46% 11.26% 107.00%
Affiliate Share of Total Investment 13.97% 6.76% 17.65% 21.60% 23.17% 65.93% 242.99%
Developed Country Affiliate Share of Investment 11.88% 5.79% 17.06% 20.15% 19.47% 63.86% 236.02%
Developing Country Affiliate Share of Investment 2.09% 0.96% 0.59% 1.45% 3.70% 77.35% 284.04%
Parents
Total Employment 532 867 1377 1658 4795 801.93% 453.30%
Real Wages (per worker) 16.79 15.94 17.71 17.03 20.78 23.74% 30.36%
Labor’s Share 91.46% 88.00% 85.70% 90.68% 81.24% 11.17% 7.68%
Developed Country Affiliates: All
Total Employment 73 68 255 333 1243 1593.31% 1734.97%
Real Wages (per worker) 13.28 15.05 13.88 14.45 13.86 4.37% 7.91%
Labor’s Share 75.93% 45.66% 82.20% 72.93% 75.48% 0.60% 65.30%
Developing Country Affiliates: All
Total Employment 24 20 26 60 363 1436.03% 1696.20%
Real Wages (per worker) 7.43 9.03 5.38 4.69 4.45 40.11% 50.72%
Labor’s Share 88.58% 94.40% 84.72% 90.09% 84.79% 4.28% 10.17%
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Note: Data is for parents and affiliates with non-missing observations for labor’s share of income
and positive employment. Multiple affiliates in one country are treated as one affiliate. Excluding firms in the top and bottom 1% on the
basis of labor shares and return to capital. Weighted by employment shares, where applicable. Real wages are in ’000 of 82-84 U.S. dollars.
Employment figures are in ’000.
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about the state of the U.S. economy in the year
2015. While aggregate employment is determined
by factors other than international trade or off-
shoring, it is evident that wages will adjust as some
types of jobs are shifted abroad and replaced by
other types of employment. The extent to which
“good” jobs are created or lost, however, will de-
pend primarily on investments in physical and
human capital. If the U.S. invests heavily in ed-
ucating its future generations, then these workers
will be able to exploit the benefits of globalization,
raise productivity, and consequently increase
wages by outsourcing lower-end tasks.
OurOwnResearch
Our work differs from previous research in im-portant ways. First, we account for the factthat hiring an additional worker in a high-
wage country–where U.S. firms are likely to have
sales and other operations–is likely to have a dif-
ferent impact on U.S. employment than hiring a
worker in a low-wage country, where U.S. firms
have much smaller markets and are more likely to
be executing business generated elsewhere.8 Sec-
ond, we separately identify the impact on U.S.
employment of increasing investment by U.S.
companies at home, in low-wage and in high-wage
affiliate locations. Third, we allow for the impact
of technological change and import competition
and address the possibility that methodological
differences might be driving differences in results
by including additional relevant variables in a
multivariate regression.9
Our research suggests that measuring the im-
pact of outward investment on U.S. employment
at home is a particularly important omission.
While the negative impact of U.S. investment
abroad on home employment has been overlooked
by academics, it is a topic of great interest in the
U.S. Congress. On October 22, 2004, the Con-
gress of the United States passed the American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004. According to Section
422 of this act, U.S. parent companies that repa-
triate earnings from their foreign affiliates to in-
vest in the U.S. are subject to a reduced tax rate
on the repatriated earnings.10,11 Section 965 of
this act identifies types of U.S. investments for
which repatriated funds may be used and includes:
hiring and training workers, infrastructure and
capital investments, research and development,
financial stabilization for the purposes of U.S. job
retention or creation, certain acquisitions of busi-
ness entities with U.S. assets, advertising and mar-
keting and acquisition of rights to intangible prop-
erty such as patent rights.12 Our research suggests
that encouraging domestic investment is indeed
associated with domestic job creation, while in-
vestment in affiliates reduces domestic manufac-
turing employment.
We analyze the firm-level surveys on U.S. di-
rect investment abroad, collected each year by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S.
Department of Commerce. The BEA collects con-
fidential data on the activities of U.S.-based mul-
tinationals, defined as the combination of a single
U.S. company that has made the direct invest-
ment, called the parent, and at least one foreign
business enterprise, called the foreign affiliate.
According to Mankiw and Swagel, these are the
only reliable data available to analyze the effects
of offshore activities on the U.S. economy. We
use the data collected on majority-owned, non-
bank foreign affiliates and non-bank U.S. parents
for the benchmark years between 1977 and 1999.
The benchmark years are 1977, 1982, 1989, 1994,
and 1999 and include more comprehensive infor-
mation than the annual surveys. To our knowl-
edge, very little work has been done with the
8 Although Brainard and Riker (2001) do this, they do not account for
the impact of all of the firms’ choice variables on U.S. parent employment.
9 We also use an instrumental variables approach to control for poten-
tial endogeneity. Instrumental variables estimations corrects for the fact
that when both the dependent variable (domestic employment) and the
independent variables (foreign employment) in a regression are determined
concurrently by the firm, the strength of the relationship will be mismea-
sured.
10 We thank Ralph Kozlow for pointing this out.
11 The effective reduction in tax rates is substantial. The U.S. company
can deduct 85% of the repatriated dividends. Thus, if the company is
subject to a 35% corporate tax rate on the 15% of dividends not covered,
the company’s effective tax rate on the total repatriated dividend is 5.25%.
12 These funds may not be used for: executive compensation, inter-
company transactions, dividends and other shareholder distributions, stock
redemptions, portfolio investments, debt instruments, and tax payments.
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firm-level data using the entire length of the time
series from 1977 through 1999.13
While the number of U.S. parent companies
included in the BEA sample may appear small,
sales by these enterprises over the period 1982 to
1999 (see Table 1) accounted for over 60 percent
of total manufacturing sales in the United
States.14 These enterprises also accounted for 71
percent of all exports of goods, and nearly 60
percent of employment in manufacturing. These
multinationals also account for most of U.S. re-
search and development expenditures: over the
period 1982 to 1999, the U.S. parents included in
the BEA sample account for 82 percent of total
U.S. research and development expenditures.
Table 1 shows that between 1977 and 1999
multinational manufacturing firms shed more
than 3 million jobs in the United States.15 Table
1 also documents that labor’s share of income
(defined as parent compensation divided by the
sum of parent compensation and parent net in-
come) in the U.S. has fallen from 96 to 79 per-
cent. While the fall in labor’s share is consistent
with recent reductions in labor’s share of income
in U.S. GDP, the decline is also consistent with
the fact that manufacturing in the United States
has become increasingly capital-intensive. The
loss of jobs in the U.S. has been mirrored by job
reductions for affiliates in developed countries,
with the greatest declines in the United Kingdom,
Canada, France, and Japan. These job losses have
been only partially offset by an increase in the
number of jobs in developing countries, where em-
ployment expansion was greatest in two countries:
Mexico and China. In developing country affili-
ates, the number of jobs increased by half a mil-
lion between 1977 and 1999 and by three quarters
of a million between 1982 and 1999. In develop-
ing countries, labor’s share also fell. Unlike in the
developed countries, real wages paid by U.S.-
based multinationals to employees in their devel-
oping country affiliates have actually fallen. The
evidence for the U.S. parents is in line with the
aggregate trends in the U.S. manufacturing sec-
tor.16 To summarize, in U.S.-based manufacturing
multinational firms, jobs have declined within the
U.S. and in the operations in developed countries.
While wages have increased slightly in high in-
come affiliates, labor’s share of income has fallen
in both the United States and in high income
affiliates, reflecting in part increasing capital in-
tensity. In developing countries, employment is
rising, but wages have declined, presumably re-
flecting the constant search for cheaper labor
costs.
The proportion of total global employment of
U.S. manufacturing-based multinationals that are
based outside the U.S. increased from 28 percent
in 1977 to 35 percent in 1999. The increase was
almost entirely driven by a doubling of affiliate
employment shares in developing countries, from
8 to 15 percent. Affiliate employment in devel-
oped countries, as a share of total worldwide em-
ployment, remained roughly constant over the
entire period at around 20 percent. The percent-
age of employment, all employee compensation,
and investment accounted for foreign affiliates
increased by 20, 22 and 11 percent, respectively,
over this period. This increase in overseas activity
has been largely reserved for developing countries
where the respective increases are 44, 47 and 31
percent.
Among these multinational firms, the contrac-
tion in domestic jobs in the manufacturing sector
13 For details on data construction, see our NBER working paper,
Harrison and McMillan (2006).
14 See the December 1996 issue of The Survey of Current Business,
“Operations of US Multinational Companies: Preliminary Results from the
1994 Benchmark Survey,” by Mataloni and Fahim-Nader, as well as the
authors’ own calculations.
15 It is important to note, however, that some of these changes in
employment might simply reflect acquisitions and spin-offs. However, at
least in the aggregate, since most sales of U.S. multinationals are to other
U.S. multinationals, and the firms would still remain in our database even
if they were acquired, information about spinoffs is only available for 1989
to the present.
The variables we use are reported to the BEA on the basis of the fiscal
year. General trends in employment weighted averages are reported in
Table 1 for manufacturing and in Table 2 for services. The numbers in
Table 2 include all firms classified in services under the SIC classification
prior to 1997 and under the NAICS system post-1997. Because the NAICS
system classifies some industries as services that were not previously clas-
sified as services, the employment numbers are slightly exaggerated. How-
ever, when we restrict our analysis of services to only those sub-categories
that can be exactly matched across years, we get nearly identical trends.
16 According to the NBER Manufacturing Productivity Database, la-
bor’s share in value-added declined from .53 to .31 – roughly 50% - over the
period 1958 to 1996. Over the period of time for which the two datasets
overlap, employment and labor’s share in income both move in the same
direction – down.
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has been more than offset by job creation in the
services sector.17 Table 2 presents results for ser-
vice sector operations and shows that between
1977 and 1999, total employment by U.S. com-
panies increased by more than 4 million or 802
percent. Jobs expanded at home and abroad. Em-
ployment increased from 73,000 in 1977 to 1.2
million in 1999 in developed countries and from
24,000 in 1977 to 363,000 in 1999 in developing
countries. While affiliate activity in services is still
less than that for manufacturing, it has nonethe-
less been growing more rapidly. Foreign affiliate
shares in U.S. firms’ world-wide employment, em-
ployee compensation, and investment has risen by
63, 62, and 66 percent, respectively. The expan-
sion of U.S. multinationals into developing coun-
tries has been accompanied by a reduction in
labor’s share at the parent level of 11 percent.
Unlike in manufacturing, labor’s share overseas
has remained relatively constant.
It is important to keep in mind that throughout
the period 1977-1999, real compensation per
worker in the service sector amounts to little more
than half of real compensation per worker in the
manufacturing sector. This may be partly a reflec-
tion of a change in the mix of workers in the U.S.
manufacturing sector—if lower-wage, unskilled
jobs in the U.S. have gone abroad, then the av-
erage wage in the U.S. manufacturing sector may
rise. However, the fact that this differential ex-
isted even in 1977 before the big contraction in
U.S. manufacturing suggests that this is not the
only reason for the difference. What Tables 1 and
2 do show is that employment in manufacturing
has declined while employment in services has
increased, and that average compensation in ser-
vices was well below compensation in manufac-
turing even at the start of the sample period.
BroadTrends
We now turn to a discussion of broad trends inthe pattern of manufacturing employmentchanges in U.S. parents and their affiliates.
We restrict our analysis to the period 1982 to 1999
for comparability with the work by Brainard and
Riker (1997, 2001) and Desai et al. (2005) who
used these same data beginning in 1982. As a first
test of whether U.S. parents are substituting U.S.
employment with affiliate employment, we cre-
ated a series of graphs to show how employment in
foreign affiliates affects employment at home. In
Figure 1, changes in parent (U.S.) total manufac-
turing employment are indicated by the horizontal
axis and changes in affiliate total manufacturing
employment are indicated by the vertical axis. A
point in the upper right-hand quadrant indicates
expansion both at home and abroad. A point in
the lower left-hand side quadrant indicates con-
traction at home and abroad. Substitution occurs
if data points are either in the upper left-hand
quadrant (indicating contraction at home and ex-
pansion in affiliate employment) or in the lower
right-hand quadrant (indicating expansion at
home and contraction abroad).
Most U.S. critics of globalization center on
supposed activity in the upper left-hand quadrant,
which would indicate expansion of affiliate em-
ployment and contraction of employment in the
U.S.; so-called substitution of foreign for U.S.
jobs. As Figure 1 shows, most of the activity of
U.S. manufacturing multinational enterprises has
taken place in the upper and lower left-hand
quadrants, indicating employment contraction at
home. Almost half of the reported activity has
taken place in the upper left hand quadrant, in-
dicating contraction at home and affiliate expan-
sion.
Figures 2 and 3 separate changes in employ-
ment from 1982 to 1999 based on the location of
the parent’s affiliates. Figure 2 reports employ-
ment changes for developed country affiliates and
parents; Figure 3 reports the same trends for de-
veloping country affiliates. The trends are similar
across Figures 1 and 2–employment in high-
income affiliates and parent employment are com-
plementary but that relationship is driven by the
contraction in manufacturing. However, Figure 3
reveals that employment in low-income affiliates
substitutes for employment in the U.S. Moreover,
the downward sloping regression line appears to
be driven by contraction in two key sectors: com-
puters and electronics.
17 The classification of a firm into manufacturing or services is based on
NAICS codes, which are standard ways of classifying the output of an
enterprise. Whether an enterprise is classified into one or another sector
depends whether the majority of its sales are in manufacturing or services.
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While the stylized facts reported in Tables 1
and 2 and the figures are useful for explaining why
opinions on the outsourcing of U.S. jobs are so
different, these facts do not tell us enough about
the underlying mechanisms at work. The fact that
substitution occurs only between U.S. jobs and
jobs in low-wage countries suggests that labor
costs are an important factor in that process. Our
goal is to estimate and compare the relative im-
pacts of alternative modes of globalization on U.S.
jobs and wages, taking into account differences in
aggregate demand, factor prices, and technology
shocks across different locations.
Results
Previous work has used a variety of approachesto test for the impact of foreign affiliate activ-ity on labor demand at home. To help us
disentangle why previous results seem to contra-
dict each other, we adopt a general enough frame-
work that we can imbed all these different ap-
proaches into our estimation strategy and compare
results for consistency across specifications. Our
first result confirms the conclusions reached by
Desai et al.: aggregating across all locations, em-
ployment expansions and contractions in U.S.
multinational parents and their affiliates on aver-
age move in the same direction. A 10 percent
increase in foreign employment would lead to a
1.22 percent increase in U.S. parent employment.
However, this correlation is driven by the overall
contraction in U.S. manufacturing employment,
which has been accompanied by an overall con-
traction in affiliate employment. We then show
that these averages mask significant heterogeneity
across different kinds of enterprises.
For those companies that employ workers in
developing countries–roughly half the sample–
the story is different. For these firms, the contrac-
tion in U.S. manufacturing employment has been
accompanied by an increase in affiliate employ-
ment. This evidence suggests that employment in
low-income affiliates substitutes for U.S. employ-
ment. The estimates imply that a 10 percent in-
crease in affiliate employment in high-income
countries is associated with a .4 to .5 percent
increase in U.S. employment, while a 10 percent
increase in affiliate employment in low-income
countries is associated with a .3 to 2.1 percent fall
in U.S. employment. If employment in high-
Figure1
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income affiliates is positively correlated with U.S.
employment, then the contraction in high-
income affiliate employment implies a fall in U.S.
employment. Similarly, expansion in low-income
affiliates is associated with a fall in U.S. employ-
ment; the documented expansion of U.S. multi-
national affiliates in low-income regions helps ex-
plain the downsizing of manufacturing
employment in the United States. We also exam-
ine separately the impact of hiring skilled and
unskilled labor abroad. We find that substitution
between U.S. and foreign affiliate labor occurs
primarily within unskilled worker categories in
low income countries. In other words, the low
wage, unskilled jobs are the ones going to low-
income countries.
Although the negative impact of affiliate em-
ployment in low-income countries on U.S. man-
ufacturing employment is statistically significant,
other factors have also played an important role in
determining employment at the firm level. Our
research suggests that an expansion in the U.S.
capital stock increases home manufacturing em-
ployment, while an expansion in the affiliate cap-
ital stock reduces home employment. The reason
for this, of course, is that capital investment rep-
resents machinery and equipment, and jobs are
tied to those investments. A 10 percent increase
in the capital stock at home is associated with an
increase in U.S. manufacturing employment of
between 6.4 and 10.4 percent. Conversely, a 10
percent increase in capital stock in high- or low-
income affiliates is associated with a decline in
U.S. employment of between .1 and 1.8 percent.
Since the capital stock in affiliates increased by
over 100 percent between 1982 and 1999, this
diversion of investment towards affiliates resulted
in a decline of up to 24 percent in U.S. manufac-
turing employment. Although our research shows
that it is difficult to be sure about the precise
magnitude of the effect of overseas investment by
U.S. companies on their domestic employment,
one result is clear: the impact is negative.
Increases in trade, both arm’s length and be-
tween the U.S. parent and its affiliates, are also
associated with a reduction in labor demand at
Figure2
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home. The over 10 percentage point increase in
arm’s length import competition within the U.S.
facing the multinational companies in our sample
was associated with a decline in U.S. manufactur-
ing employment of 2 to 3 percent. Increases in
imports from (exports to) the foreign affiliate are
also associated with a fall in U.S. employment.
While a decline in domestic employment associ-
ated with increasing exports from the U.S. parent
to its foreign affiliate seems puzzling, the data
shows a strong positive correlation between ex-
ports to foreign affiliates and exports to foreign
affiliates for “further processing.” These exports
may be unfinished goods that will be completed by
foreign workers – essentially offshoring. Foreign
demand shocks are also associated with significant
effects on U.S. employment, suggesting that for-
eign GDP growth in affiliate locations promotes
employment at home.
The overall reduction in labor intensity within
U.S. manufacturing is partially explained by the
fact that technological changes in recent years has
been “labor-saving,” leading to greater productiv-
ity and the need for fewer workers. We examine
technological change using the share of research
and development employees in the firm’s labor
force as a proxy variable. Our estimates suggest
that a 10 percentage point increase in the parent’s
R&D employee share would be associated with a 5
to 9 percentage point decline in total parent em-
ployment. Although parent R&D employment
only increased by 2.1 percentage points on aver-
age between 1982 and 1999 (implying a reduction
in home employment of 1 to 2 percent), the
coefficient estimates suggest that technological
change as a source of falling manufacturing em-
ployment could be important in the future.
Our results indicating that employment in low-
income affiliates is a substitute for U.S. employ-
ment are robust to whichever framework we
choose, although the magnitudes vary. However,
the large employment increases and significant
wage declines in developing countries (see Table
1) only partially explain the large observed fall in
employment in the United States. Other aspects
of globalization have also played a significant role.
Figure3
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One factor that has not received any attention in
previous literature is the impact of U.S. multina-
tionals expanding their physical investments
abroad. Increases in the capital stock in foreign
affiliates are associated with significant declines in
U.S. employment. These declines are at least as
important in magnitude as the impact of expand-
ing foreign employment. All the approaches show
that both arm’s length trade, as captured by U.S.
import penetration, and intra-firm trade have also
played an important role in reducing U.S. manu-
facturing employment.
We summarize the effect of all these different
factors on U.S. manufacturing employment in Ta-
ble 3. We combine the coefficient estimates dis-
cussed above with actual changes in employment,
investment, trade, R&D intensity, and GDP per
capita changes across affiliate locations. The com-
plete picture shows that the major determinants of
contraction in U.S. manufacturing parent em-
ployment have been: 1) increased employment in
low income affiliates, 2) increased physical invest-
ment abroad, and 3) goods imported from the
affiliate to its U.S. parent. The employment losses
associated with the expansion of U.S. investment
in low-income countries are three times more im-
portant than the employment losses due to hiring
more workers in those countries. The major de-
terminants of employment expansion at home are
increases in U.S. physical investment and in-
creases in GDP per capita in high-income affili-
ates, who are more likely to be customers for the
products and services of the U.S. companies.
Why should employment levels of operations
Table3
Calculating the Impact ofDifferentAspects ofGlobalizationonU.S. EmploymentOutcomes
Factors Affecting U.S. Labor
Demand
Impact of a 10
percent Increase in
Factor on
Percentage Change
in U.S. Employment
(OLS Estimates)
(1)
Impact of a 10
percent Increase
in Factor on
Percentage Change
in U.S. Employment
(Instrumental
Variable Estimates)
(2)
Actual Increase
in Factor in BEA
Sample
(3)
Minimum
Percentage Change
in Labor Demand
(Equals Column (1)
x Column (3))
(4)
Maximum
Percentage Change
in Labor Demand
(Equals Column (2)
x Column (3))
(5)
Log Employment
High-Income Affiliates
0.44% 0.49% 8.8 % .039% 0.043%
Log Employment
Low-Income Affiliates
0.31% 2.11% 38.9 % 1.21% 8.21%
Log Parent Capital Stock 6.43% 10.37% 34.8 % 22.38% 36.09%
Log Capital Stock
High-Income Affiliates
0.14% 0.22% 123.9 % 1.73% 2.73%
Log Capital Stock
Low-Income Affiliates
0.20% 1.81% 130.5% 2.61% 23.62%
U.S. R&D Employment Share 5.30% 8.52% 2.1% 1.11% 1.79%
U.S. Import Penetration 1.90% 3.43% 11.0 % 2.09% 3.77%
High-Income Affiliates
Log GDP per capita
0.20% 0.21% 151.0 % 3.02% 3.17%
Low-Income Affiliates
Log GDP Per Capita
0.10% 0.01% 18.00 0.18% .02%
Exports to Foreign Affiliates
(Share in Sales)
4.10% 23.99% 1.2 % 0.49% 2.89%
Imports from Foreign Affiliates
(Share in Sales)
1.00% 50.93% 2.2 % 0.22% 11.20%
Note: Numbers in column (1) taken from Table 5; column (4) from Harrison andMcMillan (2006); column (3), first two rows taken from
Table 1 in this paper; column (3) remaining rows taken from Table 3 of Harrison and McMillan (2006); column (4) is calculated as the
product of columns (1) and (3); column (5) is calculated as the product of columns (2) and (3).
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in high- and low-income countries have different
effects on the level of employment back in the
United States? Multinationals setting up affiliates
in low-income countries are attracted by low labor
costs, and consequently are replacing U.S. with
foreign labor to manufacture their goods. Multi-
nationals locating in high-income countries are
more attracted by potential market opportunities,
and consequently expansion abroad is comple-
mentary with employment at home. These differ-
ent motivations for offshore activity lead to dif-
ferent effects on U.S. employment. Hiring by
affiliates hurts U.S. employment when those affil-
iates are in low-income countries but helps U.S.
employment when those affiliates are in high-
income countries. Since all the recent expansion
of offshore outsourcing in manufacturing has been
in low-income countries, we can expect further
substitution of U.S. manufacturing jobs in the
future.
These differences in impact on U.S. employ-
ment should also provide insight into how future
offshoring of services will affect the U.S. labor
force. Our research also highlights how misleading
a pure emphasis on the flow of jobs abroad can be
for understanding U.S. employment levels, as
many other factors affect domestic employment
decisions. In particular, Table 3 shows that phys-
ical investment in any affiliate location hurts U.S.
employment, providing support for recent con-
gressional efforts to promote domestic investment.
ConcludingComments
We began this essay by surveying the existingstudies on the phenomenon of offshoring,which we define as expansion by U.S.-based
multinationals in foreign locations. Focusing on
manufacturing, we identify a reluctance on the
part of some economists to admit that offshoring
could be accompanied by the displacement of
directly affected workers. In fact, a number of
prominent economists have argued that U.S. mul-
tinationals create manufacturing jobs at home
when they locate operations abroad. We take issue
with this claim, citing both previous studies on
the subject as well as our own research.
Over the period 1977 to 1999 multinational
manufacturing firms shed more than 3 million
jobs in the United States. Over this same period,
the number of workers hired by affiliates in devel-
oping countries increased while wages paid to
these workers declined. These facts are consistent
with the notion that U.S. parents are exporting
low-wage jobs to low-income countries. However,
the expansion in manufacturing employment in
developing countries amounts to only one quarter
of the jobs lost in the U.S. Other factors, such as
technological change and international trade, are
also important determinants of U.S. manufactur-
ing employment.
Most research suggests that employment in
low-income affiliates substitutes for U.S. employ-
ment. But the large employment increases in de-
veloping countries and significant wage declines
only partially explain the observed fall in manu-
facturing employment in the United States.
Given that the employment costs, although real,
have been small, the net impact on U.S. wages is
uncertain. While offshoring is likely to put down-
ward pressure on wages by opening up alternative
sources of labor supply, the productivity gains
from offshore outsourcing could offset these effects
(see Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg 2006). In our
ongoing research, we are exploring the impact of
offshoring on the wages of U.S. workers.
Our evidence indicates one important aspect in
which offshoring differs from international trade:
expansion of affiliate activity is associated with a
shift in U.S. investment abroad. Our research
shows that increases in the capital stock in foreign
affiliates are associated with significant declines in
U.S. employment. Other factors have also con-
tributed to the falling importance of manufactur-
ing jobs in the U.S. labor force, and the concur-
rent rise of service employment. These factors
include international trade, as captured by U.S.
import penetration, intra-firm trade, and techno-
logical change.
From a policy standpoint, to impede foreign
investment in low-income countries would be
misguided. Allowing foreign investment to flow to
low-wage locations helps U.S. companies to sur-
vive and helps those economies to grow. While
policies to encourage domestic investment and
education are likely to yield long-run benefits,
penalizing firms that invest abroad will reduce
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their ability to compete in the world economy.
Yet to deny that there are some short-term costs to
some sectors of the U.S. economy is also wrong.
An appropriate response is not to deny that such
losses occur, but to devise programs to assist the
workers who are hurt by these developments. This
is exactly the message that Federal Reserve Chair-
man Ben Bernanke conveyed in his recent speech
in Jackson Hole, Wyoming:
“. . .Changes in the patterns of production are likely to
threaten the livelihoods of some workers and the profits of
some firms, even when these changes lead to greater produc-
tivity and output overall. The natural reaction of those so
affected is to resist change, for example, by seeking the
passage of protectionist measures. The challenge for policy-
makers is to ensure that the benefits of global economic
integration are sufficiently widely shared–for example, by
helping displaced workers get the necessary training to take
advantage of new opportunities–that a consensus for wel-
fare-enhancing change can be obtained. . .”18
To deny that some workers are displaced due to
offshore outsourcing is not just incorrect but is bad
politics, since those workers will prevent further
liberalization from taking place. Even the chair-
man of the Fed says so.
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